As web applications have grown in popularity, so have attacks on such applications. Cross-site scripting and injection attacks have become particularly problematic. Both vulnerabilities stem, at their core, from improper sanitization of user input.
Introduction
Web applications have exploded in popularity over the past decade. Security risks for web applications have risen in tandem [2] . According to OWASP [24] , XSS (cross-site scripting) and SQL injection have been the top two most common security threats for several years. Both are caused by unsanitized user input flowing into unsafe or privileged sinks such as system calls, database queries or, in modern times, client-side HTML.
Taint analysis has been proposed to solve this problem [10, 30] , by tracking and detecting whether tainted (unsanitized user input) values may flow into security sinks. To date, the dominant methods for taint analysis are dynamic [12, 13, 23, 26, 29, 33] . The main strength of the dynamic approach is that it can track tainted information through direct data dependencies in an efficient and precise way [13] . However, strictly dynamic analyses cannot prevent soft failure of the application when an unexpected taint violation happens [5, 27, 32] . The strength of static taint analyses is that they can prove the absence of taint violations, or at least delimit the regions in which they may happen.
However, sound and precise static analysis of modern scripting languages is hard. The origin of the analysis problem is the intersection of dynamism and higher-orderness. Specifically, there are four interacting facets of dynamic scripting languages: (1) dynamic allocation and modification of hash maps; (2) higher-order functions and first-class control; (3) dynamic computation and manipulation of keys; and (4) reflective access and modification of hash maps and objects, making control-flow analysis and data-flow analysis inseparable from one another and thus complicating static analysis. Figure 1 contains a simple, cut-down example of how hash tables and higher-orderness can interact in dynamic languages.
Existing analyses often don't consider these interactions, or they attempt to model hash maps as objects, a strategy which collapses to field-insensitivity reasoning when pricked with even the slightest imprecision.
We provide an extensible analytic framework rooted in abstract machines for weaving analysis of the four facets together. The framework supports generalization of higher-order shape-analytic techniques [17] , and fuses them with rich abstract domains for strings to create analytic techniques for hash maps. We then augment this sound, precise analytic framework with static taint analysis.
Overview
In this work, we provide a systematic approach to the static taint analysis for web programs written in scripting languages-even in the presence of dynamic hash maps, higher-order functions and first-class control. The ability to analyze these features in tandem is Figure 1 . An example illustrating the interplay of hash tables and higher-orderness in dynamic scripting languages. Without precise reasoning about the structure of the hash table, the calls to the handler table will be seen as invoking all functions inside the table.
a critical step towards a practical static analyzer not just for static taint analysis, but for deep static analysis of these languages in general.
We first design λH , which is a core calculus of modern scripting languages, with hash maps, dynamic objects, higher-order functions and first-class control. Then we devise a framework of k-CFA-like CESK-style abstract machines for statically reasoning about λH , but with the abstract domain of hash maps factored into a "Curried object store." This factoring allows us to recover fieldsensitivity in the presence of dynamically modified fields. Based on the resulting framework, we produces a taint analysis, leveraging field-sensitivity, interprocedural control-flow, and contextsensitivity, to handle both explicit and implicit information flow (by default), and to detect security vulnerabilities, such as XSS attacks, in web applications.
Briefly, we make the following contributions:
• λH : A core calculus of modern scripting languages.
• A "hash-flow analysis" framework for analyzing dynamic objects, hash maps with dynamic keys, first-class control and higher-order functions.
• Cardinality-based shape analysis on hash maps with dynamic keys, in order to support strong update (and deletion) of both values and taint information.
• HFTA: A static "hash-flow taint analysis" based on our sound analytic framework.
2. The setting: λ H Figure 2 presents the syntax of λH -a core calculus for modern dynamic scripting languages. It models mutable hash maps; classes and objects (which are desugared into maps); higher-orderness; first-class control and dynamic string manipulation.
λH contains the core ingredients necessary to observe collisions between the four facets: integer and string constants; first-class continuations to subsume constructs like exceptions; first-classclosures; simple primitives for operating on integers and strings; Figure 2 . Syntax for λH mutable hash maps; and a form for introspectively iterating over hash maps.
Syntactically and semantically, strings are sequences of characters:
To simplify analysis, the syntax for λH is A-Normalized [8] , but every development in this work could be replayed for a full directstyle language by mildly enriching the structure of continuations to account for the added local evaluation contexts.
Analysis design
To motivate the structure of our upcoming analytic framework, we start with a straightforward instrumentation of a traditional concrete semantics to perform static taint analysis. We then attempt a direct abstract interpretation of this instrumented semantics. The resulting analyzer exhibits several shortcomings in its reasoning about objects with dynamically modified field names, and fixing these shortcomings leads to both the Curried object store and a new analytic architecture (Section 4).
To design a taint analysis, one could extend an existing CESKstyle [6, 7] abstract machine for λH by adding an additional taint store, as present in Figure 3 .
Each machine state contains the current expression, the current environment, the store, an extended taint store, the current continuation, and a time-stamp. Environments map variables to addresses; stores map addresses to values; taint stores map addresses to the taintedness of that address.
Continuations encode the program stack, and λH needs two kinds of frames: one to denote return to a let-bound expression (letk), and another to denote return to the interior of a introspective loop (fork). The halt continuation lurks at the bottom of the stack to terminate the program.
Time-stamps are required to strictly increase each time the machine steps forward, so they can serve as a source of freshness for al-
∈ OLoc is an infinite set of object locations t ∈ Time is an infinite, ordered set of times We will skip defining the transition relation for this machine. The definition is not only straightforward, but also unnecessary for our purposes, since we will abandon this machine for a reformulation in the next section.
In particular, to model objects (and hash maps) in this semantics, objects are mapped to a base object location (some in the set OLoc). The address of an individual field comes from pairing this location with the field name, s: fieldaddr( , s).
For example, suppose we want to evaluate the expression or the taint property of (get req "data") (which would be written req["data"] in many dynamic languages). First, we look up the variable req in the current environment (ρ) to find it lives at binding bindaddr(req, 10). We then look up the address bindaddr(req, 10) in the store to find it yields object location . To look up the key "data", we would then read the address fieldaddr( , data) from the store (or the taint store in the case of taint property evaluation).
For a language like Java, where the fields in a class are determined statically, this is a reasonable structure. And, to be sure, one can model a dynamic language with flexible objects in this fashion. However, this representation is awkward even in some corners of the concrete semantics, and it becomes especially burdensome under a straightforward structural abstraction.
Attempting structural abstraction
Let us consider a structural abstraction of the concrete state-space to highlight the awkwardness that results in the abstract state-space. A structural abstraction α is a family of abstraction functions that lifts abstraction element-wise across tuples:
α(x1, . . . , xn) = (α(x1), . . . , α(xn)), monotonically and point-wise across functions:
and member-wise across sets:
To fully define a structural abstraction, one needs to define only abstractions over the "leaves" of a concrete state-space. In the case of λH , these leaves are strings (String), integers (Z), times (Time) and object/hash-map locations (OLoc), . We use Galois connections to abstract them as follows:
Strings (String) For now, we leave the abstract domain for strings opaque as the lattice String. That is, we can assume that there exists a Galois connection between sets of concrete strings and abstract strings:
This Galois connection is effectively a parameter for analysis designers to tune. Some candidates for this Galois connection include a flat constant lattice, the lattice of regular languages, and lattices induced by context-free grammars.
Integers((Z)
We assume a similar Galois connection for integers:
One might use, for instance, the domain of signs or intervals.
Time (Time) We can assume that the analysis designer is supplying an abstraction on times:
This Galois connection drives the context-sensitivity of the analysis.
Object/Hash-map Locations (OLoc) We assume a similar Galois connection for object locations:
The structure of this Galois connection drives the polyvariance of the analysis with respect to objects.
Problem 1: A partially ordered abstract address space
When lifting the abstraction to stores (including the traditional store as well as the extended taint store), awkwardness creeps in as addresses acquire a true partial order from abstract values. Originally, an abstract store maps a flat domain (the set of addresses) into a partially ordered codomain (the set of abstract denotable values). Unfortunately, the abstract addresses that result from structural abstraction have a partial order to them.
The structural abstraction of addresses is:
which yields the following abstract address space:
Because String is not a flat lattice, addresses are not flat either, which means that both abstract store and abstract taint store must be monotonic maps:
And, join on monotonic functions is point-wise:
Ramifications of monotonicity in the abstract store
Consider the following code snippet for Python:
; original Python code:
We may find during analysis at this site that the abstract value of variable f1 is {foo, bar}. In other words, we may be setting either the key foo or the key bar. So, the analysis must model both possibilities.
At first glance, the correct action seems simple: if the object o is at abstract locationˆ , then we must join the abstract store with a new entry:σ
But, this is incorrect.
The first twist: Updates are monotonic
If we were to do no more than insert just this entry into the abstract store, it would break the monotonicity of the store. To see why, suppose that the abstract value of variable f2 is {foo, bar, qux}. It is clearly the case that {foo, bar} ⊆ {foo, bar, qux}, yet the address for the latter is unaffected by the insertion, and therefore fails to account for the new value.
When we insert into a monotonic store, we must insert monotonic maps. We use the ceiling notation for monotonic maps:
So, at second glance, it seems that we need to join the abstract store with a monotonic map:
into the abstract store.
But, this is also unsound.
The second twist: Updates are also antitonic
If we were to do no more than insert this monotonic map, it would fail to report the proper value on addresses weaker than the inserted address. Consider the case where the value of f2 is {foo}. According to the update, the value of the object at key foo could contain α(3). But, this value isn't there.
To remain sound, updates to the the store must be made with respect to submaps of the map to be joined as well. That is, the analysis should perform:
This is sound.
But, it's imprecise.
The third twist: Except for bottom
By merging with all submaps of the entry to be added, the analysis adds a map that is monotonic but whose root is bottom. In short, the previous map will join α(3) to every address in the store.
Fortunately, we can fix this by adjusting the bound to exclude bottom. It is straightforward to prove this sound during the inductive step of a proof of simulation-we need not consider the only case where the key is too precise to exist.
To encapsulate these three twists, we define the "mostly antitonic update operator for monotonic maps"-:
x → y .
Moving monotonicity out of the store
Ultimately, performance concerns drive the need to eliminate monotonicity from the store. Look-up and update operations on monotonic maps are not logarithmic like those on flat maps backed by balanced sorted tree maps: the operations are linear, with the expected consequences for algorithmic complexity. In the next section, we will introduce a Curried object store to localize the monotonicity to solely hash maps, thereby isolating the damage to performance and to semantic complexity.
Problem 2: Unbounded continuations
A second apparent problem with the current concrete state-space is that the continuation component is unbounded under a structural abstraction. (Recall that continuations contain continuations.) For classical flow analysis in small-step form, the abstract state-space should be finite. Following Van Horn and Might [31] , we can make it finite by threading continuations through the store and then bounding the set of addresses. Since our focus in this work is the structure of the abstract domains for analysis of hash maps, we omit this straightforward refactoring to save space.
HFTA: Hash Flow Taint Analysis
The previous section revealed shortcomings with respect to the structural abstraction with a standard CESK architecture (as augmented with taint information). The core concern was that order on abstract key values (including strings) leaked a partial order into abstract addresses (via keys in hash maps) which then induced monotonicity in the abstract stores. Monotonicity then mangled the abstract semantics for operations like hash map update, and raised the cost of look-up and update operations on the abstract store from logarithmic to linear.
∈ OLoc is an infinite set of object locations t ∈ Time is an infinite, ordered set of times Figure 4 . A concrete state-space designed for abstraction.
In the following subsections, we will transform the concrete statespace to use a separate object store, and then we will Curry the hash maps within this store to isolate the monotonicity in Section 4.1. Then we develop abstract semantics in Section 4.2, following that we will provide a proof sketch of the soundness of HFTA in Section 4.2.4. Lastly, we also carve out cardinality shape analysis for HFTA in Section 4.3. Figure 4 presents the concrete state-space for λH .
A concrete semantics for taint analysis
The major difference from the design illustrated in section 3 is twofold
• We factored out a separate object store OStore which is added to each machine state, mapping object locations to objects, and objects are now maps from keys to values. In other words, the structure of the object store is Curried:
• In addition to factoring OStore out from the original abstract machine [6, 7] , we not only add a taint store Taint for tracking taint property of ordinary addresses:
but also an object taint store OTaint to achieve field-sensitivity for the taint property. It resembles the OStore, but with values mapping to taint property space T . That is:
The advantage of these two arrangements for object (taint) store becomes apparent under a structural abstraction, where it isolates the monotonicity to individual hash maps:
These refactorings have a second advantage: they support cardinalitylike shape analysis on hash maps and also their keys and object fields.
To initiate execution for a program pr , we define the program-tostate injector, I : Prog → State:
where t0 is the initial time.
A concrete transition relation
Next, we need a transition relation on states:
A straightforward set of rules defines this relation. For instance,
⇒ (e, ρ , σ , ω, σ T , ω T , κ, t ), where
where A : AExp × Env × Store × OStore D is the atomic argument evaluator:
where O : Op → Store × OStore → D * D is the primitive operation evaluator, and where A T : AExp × Env × Taint × OTaint → T is like A, but is evaluating taintedness:
where O T : Op → Taint × OTaint → T * → T is the taint evaluator on primitive operators.
get handles accessing a key in a hash map as:
The rule for hash map update is also straightforward:
The continuation-application helper apply : Kont × D × T × Store × OStore × Taint × OTaint × Time Σ completes the transition by dispatching on the type of continuation.
For let-based continuations:
and, for introspective iteration:
= (e, ρ , σ , ω, κ ), where
At this point, the definition of the remaining rules is straightforward, and follow the style of work done by Van Horn and Might [31] .
Abstract semantics of HFTA
We now apply structural abstraction in full to the concrete statespace of the previous section. This structural abstraction yields a framework on top of which we can layer shape analysis for hash maps for further precision.
Applying a structural abstraction to the concrete state-space yields the abstract state-space in Figure 5 .
The functionÎ : Prog →Σ provides injection into the abstract state-space:Î
wheret0 is a designated initial abstract time.ς
∈ OLoc is a finite set of abstract object locationŝ t ∈ Time is a finite set of abstract times Figure 5 . A parameterized abstract state-space.
Partial order of the abstract state-space
The partial order on the abstract state-space defined in Figure 6 lifts naturally element-wise, point-wise, member-wise and componentwise up from the leaves of the state-space: abstract locations, abstract denotable values, abstract integers and abstract times. (Abstract locations and abstract times must have a flat order.)
An explicit, structural abstraction
We can also define an explicit, structural abstraction from the concrete state-space into the abstract state-space ( Figure 7 ).
The leaves of the state-spaces allow analysis-designers to tune precision (and speed) by varying the structure of their Galois connections.
Fixing a Galois connection over abstract denotable values, specifically, for abstract string, determines how the analysis reasons about dynamic string manipulation:
The Galois connection over integers determines reasoning over arithmetic:
The Galois connection over times determines the context-sensitivity:
For a k-CFA-like notion of context-sensitivity, concrete times would become sequences of expressions, and abstract times would be k-tuples of expressions:
iff v1 = v 1 and v2 = v 2 and e = e andρ ρ andô ô andô
there existsx ∈d such thatx Figure 6 . A partial order on abstract states.
so that abstraction will select the first k expressions:
α { e 1 , . . . , en } = e 1 , . . . , e k , while concretization will append every possible tail:
The Galois connection over object locations determines objectpolyvariance:
For a monovariant (0CFA-like) treatment of objects, the abstract location allocated for a new object would be the expression from where it came. To make this correct for the concrete semantics, concrete object locations would be expressions paired with the α(e, ρ, σ, ω, σ T , ω T , κ, t) = (e, α(ρ), α(σ), α(ω), current time, so that:
Abstract transition rules
Our next step is to synthesize the abstract transition relation, (; ) ⊆Σ ×Σ.
Most of the rules are straightforwardly adapted from the literature on flow analysis [31] , so we focus on the ones that are novel for this work-the rules dealing with hash maps with taint analysis.
For allocating a hash map: Fig 8, where the expressiont + 1 expands into the recording of execution context appropriate for the desired context-sensitivity, and the abstract object allocator alloc :Σ → OLoc returns the abstract location for this object.
To match up with the earlier 0CFA-like object-polyvariance example, the correct allocator in this case would return the current ex-
; apply(κ, {ˆ },σ,ω ,σ T ,ω T ,t ), wherê Figure 8 . Allocating a hash map (object) pression:
alloc(e,ρ,σ,ω,σ
The abstract argument evaluatorÂ : AExp × Env × Store × OStore →D mimics its concrete counterpart:
whereÔ : Op → Store × OStore →D * →D is the abstract primitive operation evaluator.
The abstract taint evaluatorÂ
T : AExp × Env × Taint × OTaint →T is likeÂ, but evaluates taintedness:
whereÔ T : Op → Taint × OTaint →T * →T is the abstract primitive operation evaluator on taint property.
get handles accessing a key in a hash map:
The abstract continuation-application auxiliary function apply : Kont ×D ×T × Store × OStore × Taint × OTaint × Time → P Σ considers the application of a continuation. In the case of completing of let-bound values and taint property:
and in the case of for introspective iteration:
The jarring dissonance of this rule for the function apply with respect to its counterpart in the concrete apply is notable. According to this rule, after every iteration of the abstract loop, it will simulate (1) leaving the loop, (2) advancing in the loop and (3) repeating what appears to be the same element.
But, why?
This extreme conservatism is forced upon the analysis by a lack of shape-analytic information regarding the hash map.
A simple example highlights why this conservatism is necessary:
In this example, the loop counts the number of properties in the hash map.
With a sufficiently precise abstraction on integers, the abstract interpretation will contain a path that computes the precise count. But, if the key to an abstract hash map is imprecise, then the analysis may not know how many keys it represents, and thus, how many times to execute the abstract loop. To remain sound, it must always loop back on itself. This important subtlety, and a desire to improve the precision of analysis of introspective iteration over hash maps, is what motivates the generalization of shape-analytic techniques to hash maps in the next sections.
Proof of soundness
The formulation of the soundness theorem is standard; the abstract transition must simulate the concrete transition: Theorem 1. If:
α(ς) ς and ς ⇒ ς , then there must exist an abstract stateς such that:
Proof. Assume α(ς) ς and ς ⇒ ς . The high-level structure of the proof splits on cases with respect to the expression within ς. The structure of each case mimics the straightforward style found in [16] .
Computation of the analysis
As noted earlier, to compute the analysis as a classical small-step flow analysis, we must first thread continuations through the store in order to bound the height of the lattice for the abstract statespace. To do this in the style of Van Horn and Might [31] , reformulate continuations to contain pointers to continuations rather than continuations themselves:
At this point, analysis proceeds by injecting a program pr into an initial abstract state:ς 0 =Î(pr ), and then finding the states reachable from this state:
Another potential source of unboundedness in the abstract statespace is the abstract domain for strings. Many abstract domains for strings are infinite in height, which means widening is required to achieve termination. Each abstract domain for strings requires its own widening criteria and techniques.
Cardinality analysis of abstract hash maps
For ordinary objects and pointers, a cardinality analysis [4, 18, 19] enables strong updates (and deletions) during the analysis. With the refactoring into a Curried object store, we can generalize a cardinality analysis to keys in a hash map. The key step is to conduct a second, parallel abstract interpretation, α
, that measures the cardinality of abstract locations:
where:
We then formulate the reduced product transition of the abstractions α×α • , which effectively adds a ω • component to every state. Having this cardinality information available makes it possible to perform strong update.
The reduced abstract transition rule for hash map update demonstrates strong update on both objects and on individual keys: 
s key ∈Â(ae key ,ρ,σ,ω)
Strong deletion The same information that powers strong update also guides "strong deletion." When removing a fieldf from an abstract object at locationˆ , if the count ofˆ is one, and the cardinality of α −1 (f ) is also 1, then it is sound to delete the field from the object. If either of these conditions is violated, then this object or this field represents more than one concrete field, and removing it could be unsound. Thus, abstract deletion, by default, simply leaves the object and its field unmodified.
Implementation and evaluation
We have implemented the analytical framework HFTA for λH using Racket. To demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of HFTA, we did our experimentation for large subset of Python 3.0 and are able to precisely detect security vulnerabilities, like XSS for web applications written in Python.
The architecture is illustrated in Figure 5 . Specifically, after tokenizing source programs by PyLexer then the generation of the abstract syntax tree by PyParser, we semantic-equivalently transformed Python code into Lisp/Scheme-like language by PyTranslator, which compiles classes into closures and hash maps, instances into hash maps, fixes scoping rules like global, nonlocal, and desugars return using call/cc. In addition, we also implemented a set of built-in classes that are preloaded by the translator, including object, list, tuple, set, dict; meta operations, such as setattr, getattr and meta attributes such as __setattr__, __getattr__.
Another subprocess in the translation process is desugaring, which further desugars constructs like break, continue, all the looping variants (while, for, for/else), branching variants using call/cc. We also desugars container comprehension operations since they are used a lot in practice. How to use first class continuation do desugaring is done basically in the way as [15] . The A-Normalizer is implemented using the algorithm [14] .
The analyzer is implemented as k-CFA CESK-style abstract interpreter, which is almost translating the specification of small-step abstract semantics presented in section 4.2 (especially 4.2.3) of HFTA and the work [31] into actual code.
Preliminary Results
Series of experiments have been conducted on simple web applications written in Python. We did all these benchmarks on a machine with an Intel Core i7 930 2.8GHz CPU, 8GB DDR3 RAM, and a 80GB Intel X25-M SSD. Table 1 presents the overall results.
The first four are simple web applications but in object-oriented style with hash-table of first-class procedures: factorial (wfact), Fibonacci (wfib), color chooser (cc) and a converter (conv). srch is an open source web application in Python [9] , which is used to search a specific web site for the page users are looking for. We have deliberately enriched the Python search program for better abstraction and mimicked the architecture and coding pattern of other popular web applications in Python, like Pybloxom [1] and MoinMoin [22] .
The XSS attacks reported are previously unknown vulnerabilities. They resides in sensitive sinks, like println or write. The effectiveness of taint analysis in our framework is specifically discussed in Section 5.2.
The metric |i| |objects| is used as a crude metric for field sensitivity of objects (including hash maps, container like list, set and tuple, objects). It is a ratio between |i| and |objects|, where i = 1, 2, ... is the number of abstract location (objects) with a cardinality of i, and |objects| is total number of objects in a program. The larger the ratio of a smaller cardinality of objects, the more precise and field sensitive the analysis. In particular, we are most interested in the case where the cardinality i = 1, where is proofed sound to do strong updates for shape analysis. In Table 1 , the row metric |i| |objects| indicates reasonable precision even for five preliminary analysis.
We experimented further with the context k = 0 and k = 1 with cardinality analysis presented in 4.3, as shown in Table 2 . There is a small percentage reduction of analysis time when k = 0. (This agrees with the experimental results on context-sensitivity in [20] .) To demonstrate the effectiveness of the cardinality analysis on the Curried object store, Table 3 shows the precision of the analysis both with and without the cardinality analysis enabled.
2 .
Case Study
In this section, we take a closer look at the search engine benchmark to demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of tracking taint data flows to find vulnerabilities using our analytic framework. def do_get(self):
self.resp.gen_body() 10 def render(self):
11 write(self.resp.body) 12 13 class Request(): Table 3 . Field-sensitivity(with k = 1) and updates in objects/hash maps, under arbitrary levels of nesting, but also achieved implicit taint propagation due to control flows, such as conditional statements, function/method calls and returns, and etc, which are formally specified and illustrated in section 4.2.3.
Specifically in the code sample at line 4-10, the tainted input of s1 at line 41 and s2 at line 45 will flow into the constructor of Search at line 4 and then Request's data field at line 15, resp's result at line 8, as well as resp's body field at line 30 and line 34. That is, unsanitized input flows back to the client at line 11, creating the possibility of a an XSS attack.
To reduce false alarms, we manually wrote the annotation file that will be pre-loaded and processed by our analyzer, to "detaint" tainted values, that is, return values from the (escape in cgi module, Python's parse_request in HTTP server library will be marked untaint. So at line 46, if s2 were meant to invoke sanitizing process at line 46-the handler that is pre-installed in Request's hash map at line 16, the call at line 47 will not trigger an XSS alarm, since the data is sanitized, despite of the XSS sensitive sink that renders content to screen. While line 42 will trigger the alarm, since the content to be displayed is tainted without any sanitization.
Discussion
Currently, the analyzer for Python does not support eval, exec; these are not considered as good practice in most scripting languages and reported are seldom used in real applications [25, 28] .
Our framework is designed to analyze dynamic languages, and in practice, if one wishes to analyze a specific scripting language with our framework, one needs to develop the front-end translation into into λH . For example, in our experimental prototype for Python, all of Python's metaprogramming features (reflection) are compiled into hash maps in λH .
Related work
The overall approach of this work was to augment a powerful analysis of higher-orderness with a rich analysis of dynamic hash maps. One could easily ask why not go the other direction-take a rich shape analysis of hash maps in a first-order language and augment it with higher-orderness? Or, in fact, to encode closures flatly as dynamic objects? Work by Might, Smaragdakis and Van Horn [20] discusses the relationship between static analysis of higher-order functions and objects. It turns out that encoding closures (flatly) as objects sacrifices opportunities for precision, since is strictly contracts the abstract state-space. Analyzing closures directly allows for a nested abstraction that better separates individual bindings to variables.
In the following, we mainly compare HFTA with other work in the area of static approach for taint analysis. Related work for dynamic taint analysis can be found [3] . Existing approaches to static analysis of taints usually have one of two problems. The first problem is limited language feature supported. Pixy [11] is a static taint analysis for PHP that propagates taint information and implements finely tuned alias analysis; Xie and Aiken designed a more precise and scalable analysis for detecting SQL Injection attacks in PHP by using block-and function-summaries. Unfortunately, both of these can't be used to track taint information in objects or hash maps. This is also the case for other work, such as [21, 34, 35] , and one of the few static analysis for Python [28] .
The second problem is the lack of soundness in existing approaches [30] . Realizing tracking data-flow through hash maps is difficult, [30] resolves the problem with the assumption of constant hash keys, an assumption quickly violated by many real programs. Moreover, the "nested taint depth" is tuned to be at most two levels, which, once again, exceeds the behaviors commonly experienced in modern web applications.
Our approach tackles both problems simultaneously. It tackles robustness with respect to complex language features by constructing a systematic abstraction of an abstract machine for a core calculus of those language features. The same systematic approachthe systematic conversion of an abstract machine into an abstract interpreter-simultaneously guarantees soundness, thereby tackling the second problem.
Conclusion and Future work
In this work, we provide a systematic approach to the static taint analysis for web programs written in scripting languages-even in the presence of dynamic hash maps, higher-order functions, and first-class control. The ability to analyze these features in tandem is a critical step towards practical static analyzer for modern web applications, not just for static taint analysis, but for deep static analysis of these languages in general.
We have implemented our framework for Python, conducted preliminary experiments with small web applications. By achieving a low rate of manually resolvable false alarms, we demonstrated the promise, feasibility and effectiveness of our approach.
In future, we are going to carve out more precise and specific analysis on top of HFTA. The first one is a must-contain key-shape analysis of hash maps, similarly as cardinality shape analysis of abstract hash maps but with more precise information to compute dynamic keys that must be within a map, in addition to knowing which may be within the map. This can further improve precision of field-sensitivity for both hash maps and dynamic objects. The other direction we will pursue is the static string analysis based on our framework. Though the analysis challenge exposed by the micro-benchmarks are tackled by our current analytic framework, we are considering to compile larger set of Python and libraries to practice the analyzer on larger web applications in Python. We are also integrating Abstract Garbage Collection technique [18, 19] into our analytic framework for scalability improvement, which is reported to significantly reduce analysis complexity.
